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Summary findings
Over the past two decades, finance theory has  His study shows that banks and nonbank financial
contributed significantly to understanding banks and  intermediaries perform complementary functions
identifying what qualifies them to be special financial  essential to the economy. Risk reduction policies in
intermediaries.  payment systems, banking asset allocation, and the
Historically, banks have had a comparative advantage  deposit market affect the economy's tradeoff between
in certain functions-such  as providing liquidity and  risk and efficiency and the cost of generating resources to
payment services and supplying credit and information-  finance production.
which competition, technological change, and  As possibilities for global communications expand,
institutional development have increasingly eroded. And  trust will matter more than ever, and banks and other
the spread of e-money could deal a blow to conventional  financial intermediaries will be in a good position to
banking, generating entirely new ways of doing finance.  bridge gaps in trust when it comes to creating money and
After integrating his examination of money,  intermediating funds.
production,  and investment, Bossone argues that banks
remain special in that they lend claims on their own debt
and the public accepts the debt claims as money.
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2"The banker..  .is not  so much primarily a  middleman in the
commodity  'purchasing  power'  as  a  producer  of  this
commodity... He stands between those who wish to form new
combinations  and the possessors of productive means. He is
essentially  a phenomenon  of development,  though only when  no
central authority  directs the social process. He makes possible
the carrying  out of new combinations,  authorizes  people, in the
name of society  as it were, to form them. He is the  ephor of the
exchange  economy."
(Schumpeter,  1934,  p. 74)
1. What is a bank?
Recently, in one of its School Brief series on finance, the Economist magazine has
repeatedly described banks as intermediaries between savers and users of capital.'  If the
educational programs of renowned specialized media are reflective, as one would assume,
of the knowledge that prevails among experts and practitioners of a human discipline at a
certain point  in time,  one  should take  the Economist's  definition  for banks,  however
simplistic it may sound, as a piece of widely accepted, basic economic knowledge. After
all, Fama  (1980)  introduced his  theory  of  commercial banking  by  defining  banks  as
"...financial  intermediaries that issue deposits and use the proceeds to purchase securities"
(p. 39), and some two decades later the same definition is adopted by a leading text on
banking theory (Freixas and Rochet, 1997).
Banks are nothing more nor less that financial intermediaries, the view holds. And
to find evidence of this apparently unambiguous statement, one would only have to look at
the history of banks since their archetypal forms camne  into being more than two millennia
ago. However sophisticated their business has since become, banks in their very essence
have always lent out the funds that were first placed with them by some patient money
holders.
Nothing more, nothing less than internediaries.
See  The  Economist,  various  issues,  October-December  1999.
3But through  the years, and  still today, banks have been the  object of particular
concern from many quarters in most of the world, including governments, their publics,
and the economic profession. For some reasons, they have been regarded as a special type
of intermediary, one that needs differentiated treatment by the regulatory authorities and
even special protective measures from competition and risk of failure. Indeed, there is no
question that banks everywhere have received special treatment, to the point that one might
legitimately believe that banks are special simply because they are specially regulated, or
because regulators have made them so (Tobin, 1963; Kareken, 1985).
Is this concern with banks justified by a truly special nature of theirs? Do banks
perform unique functions that can be complemented and maybe partially supplemented, but
not quite entirely replaced by other types of intermediaries? And why in most cases have
banks  taken  off  earlier  than  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  throughout  economic
development? Might this be the reason why they have attracted so much attention from
regulators - which, to be sure, would equally tum to other financial intermediaries if these
were to develop to a comparable extent?
In  other words:  are banks  special because  of  some  functional peculiarities,  or
because of historical developmental patterns? And, if  history is  the answer, did  it just
happen this way, or was there a necessary (natural) cause for it to go the way it did?
Over the last two decades, the literature in the theory of finance has inquired into
the nature of banks trying to address what's unique (if anything) about their function, and
whether their uniqueness (if admitted) has survived the revolution in technology and the
large and deep wave of financial liberalization that opened the gates to  a  flood of new
intermediary types and financial instruments competing with banks and with their products
for the  public's  money. Progress  in  other branches of  economic  theory, such  as  the
economics of information and contracts, and game theory, has been key in the search for
insights. In the process, several answers have been given to these questions, and much has
been learnt  as  to  how  intermediaries of  various  kinds  operate  in  the  economy;  how
different,  similar,  or  even  complementary their  functions  can be;  and  how  different
intermediation instruments coexist and may eventually replace each other in the market.
As technological progress transforms at exponential speed the ways and means of
doing business in all sectors of the economy, it may be worth to re-explore the issue of the
4special nature of banks in the light of the established (and still growing) body of knowledge
on the subject. The question looms particularly relevant in the context of the debate on the
relationship between finance and economic development: as the interest intensifies on how
best to design financial systems conducive to high and  sustainable economic growth in
developing economies, gaining a better understanding of any distinctive role of banks and
nonbank financial intermediaries becomes a key undertaking.
The  study is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the reasons  given in  the
literature as to why banks are considered special intermediaries; major contributions and
some recent works are discussed in the section. Section 3 points to the need to take an
integrated view of money, production, and investment to gain a full understanding of the
special function of banking and its complementary role to nonbank finance, and describes a
functional approach to  do so.  Section 4  uses the approach to  analyze the interactions
between banks and nonbank intermediaries and their impact on the real economy. Section 5
evaluates how risk-reduction policies for payment systems, bank asset allocation, and the
deposit market may affect the economy's risk/efficiency tradeoff and the cost of generating
production finance. Section 6 discusses the relevance of banks in a world where non-banks
subtract an increasing share of their business, financing production becomes a relatively
less important source of banking business, and the use of e-money tends to spread fast.
Section 7 looks at the way banking and finance interact during different stages of economic
development, generating various efficiency/stability configurations. The section discusses
the possible impact of the electronic age revolution on the role of banking and financial
intermediation.
2. What makes banks special: a review of the literature
Traditionally, the specialness of banks has been traced to the monetary nature of
their (demand deposit) liabilities and to their running the economy's payment system. Since
the early experience of the deposit-taking institutions of the nineteenth century, banks have
issued debt instruments that are accepted as means of exchange and payment on the basis
of a fiduciary relationship among the agents using them and between the agents and the
issuing banks.
5Supplying transaction (and portfolio management)  services is what  characterizes
banking according to Fama (1980), while Kareken (1985) emphasizes the central role of
banks  in managing  the payment  system. 2 Corrigan (1982) adds  to  these  functions the
banks' twofold role of backup sources of liquidity for all enterprises in the economy and of
transmission belt for monetary policy. 3
Others have objected that with the evolution of financial markets and institutions
none of the above functions is compellingly, and exclusively, pertinent to banks as such
(see  Golembe,  1983;  Golembe  and  Mingo,  1985,  and  Goodhart,  1987). In  advanced
economies, transaction account facilities are supplied by non-depository - and even non-
financial - institutions with access to payment clearing and settlement systems. Likewise,
various other financial and non-financial entities can provide credit to business, while the
backup-source-of-liquidity  function  in  times  of  economic  distress  is  in  principle
inconsistent with bank  regulations aimed to  prevent or  forestall bank  failures. Finally,
where  monetary  policy  is  mainly  conducted via  open-market  operations,  government
securities dealers (even nmore  than banks) may act as transmission belt of monetary policy
signals to the economy.
Research has thus looked for other features that may more specifically characterize
banks as special financial intennediaries. 4
What do banks do?
Banks supply credit...
Diamond (1984) finds a special feature in banks  acting as delegated monitors of
borrowers,  on  behalf  of  the  ultimate  lenders  (depositors),  in  the  presence  of  costly
monitoring. Essentially, banks produce a net social benefit by exploiting scale economies
in  processing  the  information  involved  in  monitoring  and  enforcing  contracts  with
borrowers. They reduce the delegation costs through a  sufficient diversification of their
2  Kareken  himself,  however,  and  Farna  (1980)  before  him,  have  envisioned  regimes  where  payment
transactions are divorced from banks and performed by nonbank entities or even by individual agents, which
is what is increasingly happening these days.
3 In revisiting the issue almost two decades later, Corrigan (2000) confinrs  his original view.
6loan portfolio. But  if  Diamond's  result  shows that  banks'  specialization  in monitoring
credits improves social welfare, neither it proves to hold for banks exclusively - since any
kind  of  intermediary  may  equally benefits  from portfolio  diversification  - nor  does it
explain why loan contracts are not replaced by more efficient risk-sharing, state-contingent
contracts that reduce asymmetric information (such as equities).
What is in fact characteristic of bank loans is that their value is fixed in nominal
terms and that they include  collateral requirement  clauses as well as  costly bankruptcy
provisions. By factoring ex-post information asymmetries and agency costs in the credit-
making process, Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that such contract types - which they call
standard debt contracts (SDCs) - are optimal financial arrangements that, on the one hand,
save on the creditor's  costs of monitoring states of nature throughout the life of the loan
and,  on  the  other,  give  borrowers  an  incentive  to  minimize  the  risk  of  default  and
discourage them from hiding their true business performance.
The optimality of SDCs suggests a powerful argument to explain why banks have
historically emerged as the first form of financial intermediation virtually everywhere when
capitalistic production took place. However, SDC optimality is not robust against changes
in the universal risk-neutrality assumption used by Gale and Hellwig in their model and
does  not  hold  in  the  case  of  ex-ante  information  asymmetries,  where  SDCs become
exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard risks. 5 Besides, as information and contract
performance are crucial to the SDC optimality result, one would expect bank specialness to
fade with the development of financial infrastructure since this provides agents with better
information  and  more  efficient  contract  enforcement  technologies  leading  investors to
prefer non-SDC contract types. Bank  specialness is therefore  a product of history, much
like its own disappearance at some point.
Terlizzese  (1988)  uses  ex-ante  asymmetric  information  as  a  rationale  for
depositors'  preference  to  lend indirectly  (by writing an  SDC with  a  bank)  over  direct
financing of individual entrepreneurs. As depositors  are faced with  a  "lemon" problem,
they generate a demand for delegated screening which banks have a comparative advantage
4 Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) offer an extensive, critical review of the mnajor  issues and research areas
relating to banking  intermediation. For  the public  of  Italian readers,  Marotta  and Pittaluga  (1993) is an
excellent reference.
7to perform. In a repeated-game situation, the related agency problem  is solved through
reputation incentives.6 Wang and Williamson (1998), too, show typical debt contracts and
intermediaries to develop in credit markets where screening borrowers is costly. This result
is particularly useful since ex ante screening costs appear to be much more important than
ex post state verification (auditing) costs for the functioning of credit markets.
...and provide liquidity
The  credit  view  of  bank  specialness  underscores  the  relevance  of  banks'
informational advantage vis-a-vis individual investors. Banks specialize in extracting and
processing information concerning borrowers through their close relationship with them
and in a way that is not replicable by individual investors. Bank information may be very
exclusive and made unavailable  to  others. This is  tantamount to  saying that  loans  are
illiquid to depositors and non negotiable in the market. Yet,  as noted above, transferring
funds from savers to  fund users is not strictly peculiar of banks  as such, and does not
necessarily imply use of SDCs which the banks typically adopt. However, banks finance
illiquid loans with liquid deposits which bear shorter maturity than loans, have nominally
fixed value, and are available to holders on demand. The specialness of banks must thus
rest with their capacity to provide liquidity services.
This is the core message of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Instead of placing their
endowments in  an  illiquid production  technology, agents  deposit  them  with  banks  in
exchange for (interest-bearing)  claims which  entitle  them  to  withdraw  the  deposits to
finance future, unanticipated consumption needs (whose risk of materializing is assumed to
be uninsurable). The agents thus gain greater consumption flexibility. Withdrawal requests,
however, are served sequentially on a first-come-first-serve basis until the bank runs out of
assets; thus, depositors face a positive risk of not being able to exercise their claims if the
bank's  assets run  out  before their request  for withdrawal  is  submitted.  The return  on
deposits, on the other hand, enables the agents to achieve higher future consumption than if
S Terlizzese (1989) shows state-contingent contracts (requiring no collateral) to be superior to SDCs in terms
of efficient diffusion of infornation  and risk sharing, under ex-ante informational asymmetries.
6 Interestingly, due to the ex-ante infonration  asymmetry, banks should not find it possible to have depositors
agree on deposit contracts contingent on states of nature,  which provides an  enlightening explanation for
banks'  common use of SDCs to finance their assets,
8they realized the illiquid assets. Banks therefore provide agents with a liquidity insurance
service - or a higher degree of consumption flexibility - by exploiting the balance that holds
continuously, under  normal  circumstances, between  deposit  withdrawals  and  renewals
across depositors.  This  allows money to  be  shifted  from patient  holders  to  impatient
consumers.
Yet, any non-convertible type of money (say, cash) would provide at least the same
kind of consumption flexibility that Diamond-Dybvig bank  deposits offer  (although at a
different risk-return tradeoff). The specialness of banks must therefore originate from their
being able to transform liquidity into optimal illiquidity in the agent portfolios: they induce
agents to replace safe cash for slightly riskier and still sufficiently liquid instruments. But
this is possible if the banks use depositor's cash to finance longer-term, illiquid productive
assets that would not be  financed by depositors directly, and  if they extract from these
assets enough rents to reward deposit illiquidity efficiently. 7 Banks are thus intermediaries
and their specialness must be traced to their ability to integrate optimal illiquidity creation
with rent-extraction power.
In fact, they can't do one thing without the other
Fama (1985) points to the specialness of banks as deriving from integrating credit
and liquidity provision functions. By having borrowers hold deposits with them, banks can
observe deposit movements and gain private information on borrowers, which they then
feed into the processing of  new loans.  This gives banks  a  special role  as information
providers to capital market participants, who can incorporate the information embedded in
banks' lending decisions into their own evaluations. 8 Although Fama's theory may explain
why transaction- and credit-related services have historically been integrated within the
same type of institutions, it is not hard to imagine the informational advantage of banks
being eroded by information agencies that specialize in providing information concerning
the payment and credit status of individual agents.
7 The social  welfare  improvement  due to private  (bank)  money  backed by productive  assets  is discussed  by
Williamson  (1999).
8 James (1987) and Lumnmer  and McConnell  (1989)  have found confirming  evidence  to this hypothesis  by
looking  at stock  price variation  of a number  of firms after  new loan  negotiations  or revisions  and renewals  of
previous  loans,  were made  public.
9Goodhart (1986,  1987) looks at the banks'  peculiar asset  and  liability structure.
Bank assets determine the nature of bank liabilities: holding assets mainly in the form of
nominally fixed loans induces banks to issue liabilities largely in the form of deposits with
guaranteed nominal capital value. This makes banks particularly fragile to perceptions of
asset deterioration, to  an extent that even requires the setting up of  special safety nets.
Goodhart emphasizes the exclusive nature of the information banks have on borrowers as
the cause for loans'  uncertain value and non-marketability. Were it not for such special
nature of banking and if bank assets could be evaluated and negotiated in the market, a new
form of bank deposits could develop - Goodhart insists - very much similar to mutual fund
shares, whose value  would vary  with  the  value  of the  assets  and  which,  under  some
provisions, could even be used as means of payments. 9 It is not clear, though, why banks
should  not be able to use more efficient  risk-sharing  types of contract  and stick, instead, to SDCs
for loans.'°
Calomiris and Khan (1991) investigate the specific liability issued by banks in the
form  of  demandable  debt  to  finance  illiquid  assets  and  show  that,  under  costly  and
asymmetric information, demandable debt provides an incentive-compatible solution to the
potential  conflict  of  interest  between  (informed)  bankers  and  (uninformned) bank
depositors: the depositors'  right to  withdraw their claims  from a  bank,  if they become
dissatisfied with  their  deposit retums,  give  them an  incentive  to  monitor  the bank.  If
enough of them agree on a negative assessment of the bank's performance, they can call for
liquidation. As  a  result,  demandable debt  induces bankers  to  pre-commit  to  a  set  of
agreeable payoffs to depositors.
Integrating information-intensive lending and payment services distinguishes banks
from other intermediaries, according to Goodfriend (1991).11  Systems to evaluate, monitor,
and  enforce loan  agreements are productive  both  in  originating  loans to  non-financial
borrowers and in managing the lending associated with an efficient provision of payment
services. In other words, efficiency gains can be extracted from jointly producing payments
9  See Goodhart  (1987),  but also Fama (1980)  as a precursor  of this idea.
10  If the information  inferiority  and risk-aversion  of small  depositors  justify using  SDCs  for liabilities,  this is
not true for the asset side when the intermediary  possesses exclusive  access to borrowers' information.
Moreover,  if banks diversify  their assets  sufficiently,  there doesn't seem  to be compelling  reasons  why they
should  not issue SDCs  as liabilities  and  finance  assets  with  non-SDCs.
"  I am grateful  to Thorsten  Beck  for bringing  this work  to my attention.
10services and non-marketable loans. Similarly, since the same information can be used to
establish the reliability of lending and deposit taking, payments services can be provided at
lower cost by entities who also offer credit services.
Berlin  and  Mester  (1996,  1998)  emphasize  access  to  interest  inelastic  (core)
deposits as a special feature of banks. Core deposits insulate the banks'  cost of funds from
exogenous shocks and allow them, in  turn, to protect borrowers from exogenous credit
shocks. Berlin and Mester find that banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide
more smoothing of loan rates in response to exogenous shocks to aggregate credit. This
type of protection gives to both banks and borrowers an incentive to undertake multi-period
contractual agreements in which loans need not break even period by period, and allows
banks to charge higher loan rates.
Finally, Diamond and Rajan (1998, 1999) view banks as superior devices to tight
human capital to  real (illiquid) assets. They emphasize the liquidity  insurance services
provided by banks to both depositors and borrowers as being made possible by their fragile
capital structure: banks possess specific talents to collect the maximal value of loans to
entrepreneurs and attract deposits from individual investors as they can commit to pass on
them the amount they expect to collect from borrowers; they can do so because their fragile
capital structure exposes depositors to illiquidity and credit risks and makes them prone to
run on the banks if they think their claims are in danger; the run drives bank rents to zero
and provides banks with an incentive to be credible borrowers. 12 In this respect, bank runs
are no longer an undesirable feature of deposit contracts but  an essential inducement for
banks to be credible debtors.'3
12 This incentive effect is the same as in Calomiris and Kahn (1991).
13 Banks in Diamond and Rajan are intermediaries, but their fragile capital allows them uniquely to improve
social welfare by  undertaking maturity and liquidity transformation with only a minimal  amount of pre-
committed financial capital. Note, however, that no "free-lunch" factor is at play here. Although Diamond
and Rajan do not explore this issue, banks can perform their function only if their fragile financial capital is
complemented by a reputational capital sufficient to generate enough trust from depositors that their claims
will be honored by the banks at all times. Thus, banks may be seen as agents specializing in bridging the trust
gap between savers and capital users (by appropriately investing in reputational capital buildup), where the
cost for individuals to do so is too high.
113. Why banks are special: integrating money, credit, and
payment services
Integrating the credit and liquidity functions of banks, as proposed by the theories
reviewed in the last section, is necessary to  gain an understanding the many sides from
which banks interact with the real sector of the economy. Yet, all these theories share one
limitation: all implicitly assume the pre-existence in the economy of some form of money
(or, more generally, of some type of liquid claims on existing wealth) that can be deposited
with banks  and which  banks  can use to  make  loans. None  of  these theories  analyzes
banking as being characterized specifically by deposit creation.
Sir J. Hicks (1989) did so. He pointed that the banks'  ability to lend withdrawable
deposits allows banks to hand over money to borrowers without giving up any cash (or
third-party liabilities) simply by increasing their liabilities: banks create money.
Indeed, banks become special when their power is recognized to create money in
the form of debt claims on themselves, which they lend out to borrowers and which the
economy uses for payment. Banks create such new debts and promise to honor them from
the moment borrowers draw on their loan accounts to issue payments.
The functional approach to banking and financial intermediation discussed in this
section  explores  the  role  of  banks  as  credit  money producers,  and  discusses  the
implications that derive from taking such view  of banks.'4 The approach looks at how
banks necessarily integrate liquidity, credit, and payment services as they issue new money
to finance production. The approach shows how banking and nonbank intermediation serve
complementary purposes in a production economy. But  before describing the approach,
let's take note of earlier attempts to analyze bank money creation in a production economy.
Schumpeter  and  the  monetary circuitists
The role of banks in nurturing economic development through money creation was
analyzed by J. A. Schumpeter.
Schumpeter (1934) saw economic development as resulting from spontaneous and
discontinuous changes in  factor combinations, brought  about by  the entrepreneurs, that
14 For a fornal  presentation of this approach see Bossone (2000).
12would alter an otherwise steady and identical circular flow of production and exchange,
whereby the same products would be produced every year in the same way and each supply
would be matched by an equal demand (and viceversa).
But  Schumpeter  also realized  that,  whereas  in  an  ideally  steady  and  identical
circular flow all exchanges would be effected through means of payment supplied once and
for all in given quantities and circulating at a given velocity, alterations to the circular flow
could not possibly happen without creation of new purchasing power. This Schumpeter saw
as the main function of banks.
Schumpeter  thought  of money  creation via  credit  as  the  fundamental  function
through which banks enabled the entrepreneurs to adopt new factor combinations.1 5 Bank
lending allowed new resources to be forced into new channels by giving entrepreneurs the
power to exercise a demand for them.
For Schumpeter bank money (deposits) came into being in the process and for the
purpose of granting credit to firms. Banks could add to the existing means of payment by
lending  promises  to  pay,  and  entrepreneurs  could  have  access  to  bank  money  by
mortgaging goods which they would acquire with the borrowed purchasing power. Thus,
total credit could be greater than if it there were only fully covered credit.
Schumpeter  saw  that  the  bank  credit  structure  projected  beyond  the  existing
commodity base. Unlike in the steady and identical circular flow where money claims were
certificates for existing goods and past services, banks allowed for purchasing power to be
created in anticipation of, and for the production of, new output: bank money was made up
of claims on services and goods yet to be produced by the economy. Schumpeter saw that
banks did not confine themselves to transferring existing purchasing power from depositors
to  borrowers: would  they just  do  so,  economic development  would  not  be  possible.
However, his model was not articulated enough to identify different roles for banking and
nonbanking financial intermediation, and to distinguish between production and investment
finance.
15  In fact, Schumpeter  noted  that the creation  of money  by the banks  establishing  claims  against  themselves  -
as had  been  described  by A. Smith  and even  earlier  authors  - had  become  a commonplace  at his day.
13The theorists of the monetary circuit have followed on Schumpeter's  steps.'6 For
over the last three decades, they have been studying the links between bank  money and
production, and have analyzed the properties of a monetary production economy modeled
in the form of a circuit-type sequence process. Since production, incomes, and savings take
time to generate, while firms need money to finance production until receipts are earned,
new money need be  created through bank  credit. The circuit sequence thus starts when
deposits are credited by the banks on the firms'  loan accounts. The process moves on as
inputs are purchased, production starts, salaries are paid, and firms sell output and financial
liabilities to income earners. The circuit closes when the firms use the proceeds from output
and securities sales to pay back their bank debts.
Production in a circuit process can take place when money is lent by the banks to
the enterprises, and equilibrium holds if all the money used in production re-flows back to
the firms enabling them to pay off their debt. Banks create money as new loans generate
deposits that are used to finance transactions until they re-flow to the banks as loans are
repaid.
But while  circuit provides a proper  framework to  identify the  role of banks  as
producers of money, rather than mere intermnediaries  between savers and capital users, it
fails to  give a correct representation of financial intermediation by  ignoring transaction
costs and informational inefficiencies.' 7
16 Monetary  circuit theory has its major proponents  in Europe  - most notably France, Belgium,  Italy, and
Switzerland  - where different  groups  of scholars  are active under B. Schmitt, A. Parguez, and F. Poulon, J.
Cartelier,  A. Cencini,  De Vroey,  A. Graziani,  and M. Messori,  to cite  just some of the leading  names.  On this
side  of  the  Atlantic,  Marc  Lovoie  is  a  circuitist  from  Canada.  In  the  United  States,  a  circuit-based
interpretation of the saving-investment process - which I adopt in this work - was propounded long  ago and
later reiterated by P. Davidson (1965, 1991), although this author may not be  regarded as  a circuitist. The
major contributions to circuit theory do not constitute a fully unified body  of economic knowledge, and in
fact  considerable  diversity  exists  across  them.  Yet,  some  basic  and  important  features  are  clearly
distinguishable, providing conmmon  foundations for an integrated theory of money and production. Although
the literature on the monetary circuit has grown rich since the  pioneering work of Schmitt  (1959), many
publications are in languages other than English (for references, see Messori  1988 and references in Rochon
1999). Interested English-language readers should refer to Graziani (1990,  1996), Lavoie  (1985), Rochon
(1999), and Cencini (1995).
17 One notable exception on both counts is Messori (1988b). The role and the microeconomics of finance in a
sequential monetary production economy with limited information and risk are further studied in Messori and
Tamborini (1993, 1994).
14Banks and financial  intermediaries  in a production  economy
Revisiting  the circuit approach to  include the behavior  of  individual agents and
institutions under risk and limited information enhances its power to analyze the functions
of banks and financial intermediaries. I summarize below the main features of the revisited
circuit approach. 18
The  economy  includes  four  sectors:  firms,  households,  the  banking  sector
(including the central bank and commercial banks), and nonbank financial intermediaries.
As will be discussed later on, banking functions and financial intermediation functions can
be carried out by the same institutions; here, however, they are conceptually differentiated
and are assumed to be performed by separate entities. For analytical purposes, such entities
could indifferently be departments within the same institutions or subsidiaries of the same
holding company.
Economic activity is represented as a one-period circuit process with a three (intra-
period) phase sequence: a beginning phase (circuit-start), an interim interval, and an ending
phase  (circuit-end). 19 Two  commodities  are  produced  in  the  economy  for  household
consumption and capital investment from enterprises. The sequential steps of the circuit
process are sketched below and the associated flow of funds is represented in Chart I:
1)  At circuit-start (I), banks select borrowers among firms screened on the basis of their
risk and efficiency, and negotiate with the selected firns  the terms and conditions for
one-period loans. The banks credit the negotiated loan amounts on the firms'  deposit
accounts. The firms execute goods production using capital and labor, and use loans to
pay wages to workers. Deposits are transferred from the firms'  bank  accounts to the
accounts of wage earners.
Is The exposition below reflects also a further revision of the circuit model that includes the central bank and
the  use  of  central  banks  for  reserve  requirements,  free  reserves  accumulation  by  banks,  and  payment
settlement purposes (Bossone, 2000b. Available on request to the author).
19  In the reality, the economy consists of multiple and  overlapping circuit rounds  as several bank loans of
different maturity may be extended at different times, new production is carried out continuously, and debts
on old production are retired at any time. Yet, the logic of each opened round having to come to a closure, as
well as the conditions for it to do so, remain the same and can be  analyzed in a simpler, one-round process
description.
152)  In the interim interval (II), household  incomes are spent  on consumption  goods and/or
saved. Unspent incomes go into demand deposits with banks and/or into long-ternn
assets with (or through)  financial  intermediaries  in the capital markets. Firms wishing
to  add to  their stock of productive capital (investing enterprises) issue long-term
securities in the financial market. Financial intermediaries  evaluate the demand for
funds from the investing enterprises and transfer savings to those most viable, in
exchange for securities. The financed enterprises buy the capital goods needed. All
money  transfers  and payments  for goods and securities  take place through  book-entries
on accounts  held with the banks.
3)  At circuit-end  (III), the firms use their revenues  from output sales to pay off their bank
debt plus interest and the money  originally  created  is destroyed.
Chart  I. Flow  of funds in the circuit  model
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16Individual  agents optimize their  objective  functions, involving  satisfaction from
consumption for households  and profits  for non-household  agents, given prices and the
information they possess. Households supply labor services to  firms and receive wages.
Their  consumption  varies  with  their  expected  income  from  real  and  financial  assets.
Households invest a share of their savings in long-term financial assets through financial
intermediaries and hold bank deposits for transaction and precautionary purposes. Portfolio
decisions depend on assets' expected returns and on income variability.
Firms employ labor and capital to satisfy the demand for consumption and capital
goods from households and firms, respectively. Firms finance production with short-term
bank  credit at circuit-start and repay banks at circuit-end. Their net profits  are given by
revenues from output sales less capital depreciation and credit repayment. 20
The central bank advances reserve money to the banks on demand, which the banks
hold as regulatory reserves in fixed proportion to deposits and as free reserves, including
precautionary reserves and reserves for settling interbank payments.
Banks  allow the circuit process to  start; they provide  short-term loans to  firms to
finance production. They possess technology and information to select and monitor the risk
of borrowing firms and use incentives to ensure loan repayments. Since bank technologies
and information are specific to the bank-borrower relationship, bank loans are not liquid.
The supply of loans to firms is positive in the loan interest rate and negative in the
firms' risk of default anticipated by the banks. The loan interest rate is negotiated between
the bank and the firm. Banks increase lending to the point where the marginal return from
lending equals the marginal default  risk. The volume  of credit to  finms determines the
quantity of inputs that firms can purchase in the factors market.
Money  is created by the banks in  the form of  demand deposit  claims  from the
moment  firms'  loan  accounts are credited with  the  agreed  loan amounts.  Deposits are
acknowledgments of  debt by  the  banks  to  all  those  who  receive  them  as  a  result of
payments or fund transfers. Banks promise to honor such debt from the moment funds are
20 In the formal  model,  relative  prices are assumed  constant.  Thus,  the interest  rate deternines the economy's
allocation  of resources  to current and future consumption  and indirectly  determines the demand  for capital
good by investing enterprises, which is taken to increase with the difference between capital marginal
efficiency  and the cost of funds.
17drawn on the loan account by the borrowers. No cash circulates in the economy and all
payments are made through deposit transfers across bank accounts (book-entries).
Banks  extend credits to each other (subject to  risk-based  limits); thus, payments
originating from the loans do not  entail transfers of central bank  money between banks
unless and until receiving banks require paying banks to settle their debts in central bank
money, or unless and until the economy's  settlement rules  require interbank  credit/debit
balances to be settled in central bank money.
At circuit-end, banks receive debt payments from the borrowing firms. If firms are
unable to pay  off their  debt, banks have to  decide whether to  renew  (or roll over) the
original loans, restructure them, or write off their losses. Deposits are destroyed (and net
liquidity drawn from the system) when loans are repaid to the banks.
The model does not imply the existence of a money multiplier, although it includes
central bank money. Since banks can lend new deposits and use interbank credit to finance
deposit transfers, central bank money is not necessary for banks to generate loans, except
that banks need to keep a balance between  accumulated reserves  and their deposit base
(due to regulatory requirements and/or prudential practice). 21 To the extent that banks can
access reserve money  from  the central bank,  banks  may  lend  new  deposits  until  it is
convenient for them to do so after taking into account the cost of reserves. Thus, holding
reserves affects bank money creation through an incentive effect. (In principle, the central
bank may deny access to reserve money and ration bank money creation).
Financial  intermediaries  operate  in  the  capital  market,  aggregate  savings  from
several sources, and  allocate them to  capital users. Their  liabilities are not  accepted as
money by the public and  are not  used in payment transactions.  They  are specialized  in
assessing  the  profitability  and  the  risk  of  alternative  investment  options  and  the
creditworthiness of the investing enterprises. Financial intermediaries  finance investment
with long-term funds generated by savings. They increase their supply of funds until the
net-of-risk interest charged to  the investing enterprises reaches its maximum,  and ration
supply thereafter. 22
21  As noted, banks may be asked by other banks to reduce or settle their debit positions. Also, unlike in the
model above, banks are subject to demand for convertibility of their deposit in cash by the public.
22  Financial  intermediaries  can  also  act  simply  as  brokers.  This  implies  that  the  allocative  and  risk-
management functions attributed to intermediaries would be performed by the households directly. However,
18Box 1. The circuit model: objections and counter-objections
The circuit  model stands  two main types  of criticism.  Here they are briefly  discussed.
Objection: The model is  a single-period  model and does not  account for  intertemporal
behavior; as a  result, while it captures the economy's flow  of Jinds,  it does not relct
accumulation  of stocks and stock-flow  relationships.
Counter-objection: The revisited circuit  approach  discussed  in this study represents  the flows
of funds that take place as a result of decisions made by different types of real-sector  and
financial  agents  acting in a sequence.  It shows  where and how money  originates,  where  it goes,
and where it ends along a logical  time sequence.  The approach  may well incorporate  agents'
stock allocation decisions  based on long-term objectives  and expectations  and "trace" where
and how the money  initially created  flows and accumulates  along the circuit as a consequence
of  those decisions. The approach captures the effects of  stock allocation decisions by
determining  their impact  on the flow of funds, while  stock allocation  decisions  can be modeled
in ways  that take into account  the signals  that agents  extract  from changes  in the observed  flow
of funds.  Also, the approach  is flexible  enough  to incorporate  economic  and financial  structural
changes  that may alter the direction  of the money  flows over time (see secion 6).
Objectio:  The circuit  model neglects  the results  of modern  financial theory  which  explains  the
existence of  banking and financi  institutions as a  response to frictions (e.g., coss  of
information,  contracting,  and transaction)  impeding  perfect  marWet  competition.
Counter-objection: The revisited circuit approach is consistent with the use of frictions as
primitives  to rationalize  the role of financial  institutions  and instruments.  One ca  invoke  such
primitives  and yet use the circuit approach  as an integrated  setting to understand  the dfferet
and  complementary  functions of  bank and  nonbank intermediaries, and  to  analyze the
interactions of  different sets of agents in a  sequential setup., The apprah  can flexibly
incorporate  hypotheses  on how frictions  affect the behavior  of individual  agents and financial
institutions,  and can be used to assess their impact  on the economy's  equilibrium.
Finally, through their financial departments banks, too,  can act as capital market
intermediaries taking long-term deposits from the public and issuing long-term loans to
finns.2 3
this would  not alter the nature  and implications  of the model  since intermediaries  in any case can be seen  as
delegated institutions mandated by  the households to  perform those functions on  their behalf, when
performing  such  functions  directly  is too costly  for individual  households.
One could think of the bank as having  two separate  departments  - a monetary  department  and afinancial
department  - with  the financial  department  holding  a deposit  account  with  the monetary  department,  call it a
financial deposit account (FDA). When the bank raises term-funds,  it receives bank deposits  from term-
depositors'  accounts  and  credits them  on the FDA.  As the bank extend  term-loans  and borrowers  start  making
payments,  deposits move from the FDA to the accounts  of the new claimers with their banks  (the ultimate
payees). The distinction  between the monetary  and the financial  function of the bank emphasizes  that the
latter  simply  intermediates  bank liabilities  issued  under  the former.
19The supply of long-term funds from intermediaries cannot exceed their collection of
savings from the economy. In fact, intermediaries may choose not to raise more funds than
what they can (or wish to) invest. Similarly, if savers prefer deposits to less liquid assets,
intermediaries would be  rationed on  their demand  for  funds by  a  limited  supply  from
savers. The investment actually funded is thus the least between the supply and demand for
long-term funds.
In each period, the economy's  equilibrium requires that firms sell all their output
and the investing enterprises raise enough funds to settle their contract obligations with the
capital goods producers. If output remains unsold, firms need to finance its costs. From the
financial standpoint, at circuit-end all deposits must be destroyed, all money incomes must
be spent in consumption and/or investment, and firms must pay off their debt. The circuit
closes as producers use the proceeds from output sales to clear their debt with the banks. If
there  deposits  are  left  outstanding,  banks  need  to  roll  over  the  credit  positions  left
outstanding by those borrowers who have not settled their obligations.
At circuit-end, producing firms - as a group - can appropriate no more than the
money originally injected in the system. This is equal to the initial bank loans but does not
include the money needed to pay  interest. Thus, firms as  a group may at most be  in a
position to pay off the principal debt to the banks, while they need additional money to be
able to settle the interest debt share (unless banks accept payments in kind). This payment
problem  has  nothing  to  do  with  the capacity  of  the  firms  either  to  produce  and  sell
additional output, or to extract a larger surplus from production by lowering the relative
price of labor; it exclusively rests on the liquidity constraint inherent  in a circuit process
where a given stock of money, which does not cover for interest payments, is advanced by
the banks to the firms at circuit-start. 24
Resorting to the financial market to raise the needed extra cash through debt is not
an  option  for  the  firms,  since  in  equilibrium  all  existing  savings  are  absorbed  by
investments and since extra funds can be made  available to the  firrns only  if the banks
place their interest income in the capital market. But this is impossible as it requires loan
24 In fact, increasing  productivity  or decreasing  the real value of wages can only increase fmns' real profits
(or material  surplus)  but can in no way help them  raise additional  cash, if the overall  stock of cash is given.
20interest  payments  to have been made already.  Interest payments (in money) can therefore
be effected  only if banks inject  new money  in the circuit  (through  credit). 25
Chart  II exemplifies  the changes  that would take place in the balance-sheet  of each
agent acting in the circuit sequence  described  above, as a result of their interactions.  To
highlight  how banks create and inject money in the system,  the example does not include
the central  bank.
25 The sequence  would be: banks lend short-term  to firms - firns pay interests 4  banks receive interest
income  and place it in the capital market  - firms borrow  the (newly generated)  long-term  funds from the
capital market  and clear off the bank debt 4  the newly created  money re-flows  to the issuing banks  and is
thus destroyed.  Thus, as banks inject fresh liquidity, firms can convert their short-term interest debt
obligations  into long-term  liabilities  through the financial  market. This mechanism  bears implications  that
will be discussed  later  on.
21Chart  II. Transaction  effects on balance sheets in the circuit  process
Bank A
Loan Account  F  0  Deposit Account F  0
(2) - ebt pay out  100  (2) -Payment to Fi  -100
(3) + Payment from H  +80
(4) + Loan deposit from 1  +20
(5) - Debt pay out  -100
Debit with  B  0
(2) + Transfer to H  +100
(3) - Transfer from H  -80
(4) + Transfer from I  -20
Net worth  0
Firm  F  isank r
Deposits with A  0  Finauncal  oblipfdons  20  Credit  Acconnt A  0  Deposit Account H  0
(1) + Loan  depositfioA  +100  (1) + Loan  debt to A  +1O  _(2)  + Paynmnt from F  +100
(4) +Loan debt  to  1  +20  - H  (3) - Payn=t  to F  -80
(3)  Sales  toH  +80  _  m  (4)-Trans£r  foml  -20  (3)+Paymnntto  I  -20
(4) + Loan deposit from 1  +20
_ _ _  11  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Deposit  Account  1  0
(3)+Payment  fomH  +20
Physical capital  20  (4) - Transfer to F  -20
(4) + Real investment  +20  Net worth  0  Net worth  0
Household H  Intermediary  I
Deposit with B  0  Real  resources  20  Deposits with B  Obligatfons  20
(X|+W!  paynent  from F  +100  (2)+Laborservices  +100  (3)+ Pa  ent from H  20  (2) + Securities deposit H  +20
_  _  |  _  ii  -20
Financial Wealth  20
Loans  20
- 311  Net wortb  0  _  Net worth  0
Note:  The balance sheets report individual transactions originated in the circuit process described in the
text. Each transaction generates fund transfers that changes  the asset  and liability  composition  of the
balance sheets. The numbers in parentheses indicates the place of each transaction in the sequence. Items
in shaded areas indicate transactions initiated by their respective agent. All agents start with zero asset
and liability stocks. At circuit-end, stocks accumulates as a result of net flows. Firm F holds deposits at
bank A; household H holds deposits at bank B and securities deposits with intermediary I; intermediary I
holds deposits at bank B. Firm F produces both consumption and capital goods and repays its debt to A
using the proceeds from sales to H and from (long-term) lending from I. At circuit-end, the position of all
agents is balanced, the economy has accumulated new savings and  investment that add to the existing
stock of financial wealth and physical capital, respectively. Note that if H were to hold bank  deposits at
circuit-end, F would not be able to pay off its debt to A, and A would have to either rollover its credit to
F or write off the corresponding loss.
22Bank A creates deposits by lending to firm F, while intermediary I only transfers
bank deposits from household H to F by mobilizing its account at bank B. The two shaded
areas in A's balance sheet denote that money is an asset-liability created as a loan is issued
to F, entitling F to an equal deposit claim on A to be used to finance its purchases. To the
extent that the use of such a deposit claim by F generates transfers of monetary value from
bank  A to  bank  B,  credits  from  B  to  A  are necessary  to  support  the  deposit claims
transferred.
In a model where deposit transfers would have to be backed by central bank money,
bank A would need to start its operations with a capital endowment to buy/borrow central
bank money. And even if A were to borrow from B, the borrowing should consist of central
bank money.
4. What makes banks special
When  the  economy  is  considered  in  its  various  sequential  stages,  as  in  the
simplified model above, very distinctive roles appear to be played by the credit market on
one side, where liquidity is created to finance production, and the financial  market on the
other, where existing liquidity accumulated by savers is allocated to investments. This, in
turn, implies a distinctive role for banks and financial intermediaries, whereby:
1)  Banks allow the circuit to start by providing new money to production. Such money is
in the form of banks'  own liabilities, or debt claims on the banks  themselves, made
available to borrowers under credit contract terms. Banks do not intermediate existing
money, but add to it every time they extend new credit to  firms in the form of new
deposit claims, while simultaneously committing to honor the deposit claims already
outstanding. Banks  specialize in selecting borrowers to whom they allocate the new
deposit claims.
2)  Financial intermediaries collect existing liquidity (bank deposits) from savers with long
liquidity  positions  (who,  in  this  case,  part  with  their  liquidity)  and  allocate it  to
23investors with  short  liquidity positions.  Unlike banks,  the money  intermediated  by
financial intermediaries  does not represent  claims on  the intermediaries  themselves;
such money always consists of claims on banks (i.e., deposits) and, as such, it can only
move across bank accounts. Thus, while intermediaries transfer money across agents
with  different  liquidity preferences,  in no  case do  they create money. 26 By funding
investment, financial intermediaries enable capital goods producing firms at circuit-end
to  appropriate the  money  spent  in  production  and  to  service  their  short-term debt
obligations to banks. 27
What then characterizes banks from other financial intermediaries is that (i) banks
issue debt claims on themselves that are accepted as money by the public, and (ii) inject
money into the economy by lending claims on their debt.
Banks  and  financial intermediaries thus perform  functions that  are different  and
complementary in originating money and in making it circulate and re-flow to its point of
origin in the circuit process. These functions may be carried out either by separate entities
or jointly, under more universal institutions that bring banking and nonbanking activities
together. In many cases, banks operate also as financial intermediaries engaging in fund
transfers from savers to users while nonbanks can offer liquidity services on certain types
of liabilities, but this should not shade the distinctive nature of bank-money creation and
fimancial  intermediation.
This way of looking at banks has two implications for bank money. First, from the
moment it is created, bank money is simultaneously an asset and a liability  both for  the
bank that issues it and for  the borrower that receives it (Schmitt,  1982; Cencini,  1995):
banks do not create value and the newly issued money takes on value only when and if it is
associated with new production. 28
Second, whereas in non-circuit models banks intermediate pre-existing value in the
form of claims on commodities or reserve assets, in circuit models - like in Schumpeter's
view - banks issue claims on real resources yet to be generated by a production process that
26  In principle, however,  agents could conventionally  accept nonbank liabilities as money for transaction
purposes.  In this (hypothetical)  case,  the intermediary  would  de facto  become a bank.
27 This function  was well recognized  already  in  the thirties  by Bresciani  Turroni  (1936).
24those  same claims  allow firms  to  set in  motion. Banks thus  carry  a potential  for both
production and inflation (Mathieu, 1985; Rachline, 1993), and whether either prevails after
money has been issued is also a function of how well banks select their risks. 29
In sum: Banks  are special because they can finance  new production  by creating
money;  this  makes  production  financing  cheaper  than  if  banks  were  only  able  to
intermediate claims backed by pre-existing real resources.
Banks have special powers
The exclusive power to create money and to advance it at an interest differentiates
banks from financial intermediaries in some unique ways, giving them a special influence
on  the  economy's  resource  distribution  process  and  industrial  corporate  governance
structure.
Banks extract seigniorage from the economy
Where  banks  create  money  through  lending,  they  command  net  real  resource
transfers  from firms, that is they extract seigniorage from the  economy. 30 As  discussed
above, at circuit-end firms as a group may, at a maximum, appropriate just  enough money
to pay off their principal debt. When firms repay the principal, no net real resource transfer
is involved from themi to the banks. Payments of interest, however, require firms to give in
a share of their output in exchange for no additional real resources from banks; hence, the
net transfer. 31
That there is a net real resource transfer from firms to banks is explained by the
nature of the interest rate on loans. Since banks create liquidity through lending, and to the
extent that funds advanced through commercial lending do not originate from transfers of
28  This understanding of money  goes beyond the "inside money"  concept introduced by Gurley and Shaw
(1960), whereby money is a claim by some private agents on others, and a liability for its issuer.
29  This conclusion  differ from neoclassical models where banks  play a  passive  and neutral role (see, for
instance Fama 1980) on price formation.
30  For a discussion of seigniorage in an economy with a central bank  and a (commercial) banking sector, see
Baltensperger and Jordan (1997).
31  Banks may  temporarily  shift the  obligations  to  the  future by  refinancing  their  debt  over longer-term
maturity, but at some point they would have to relinquish real resources anyway as term lenders would not
postpone their credit exposure indefinitely. The net real resource transfer involved in loan interest payments is
recognized by Graziani (1988).
25pre-existing  resources,  the interest  charged  on  loans  may  not  be  conceptualized  as  a
compensation to foregone consumption and intermediation services.
In  the circuit process,  the interest  rate  (net of  the resource  costs  involved  in  lending,
including the remuneration of deposits) is a pure rent that banks extract from borrowers by
virtue of their exclusive power to create money.
Such exclusivity rests fundamentally on both government and society restricting the
acceptance of  money to  liabilities issued by  selected agents.  No rent would  in  fact be
involved  if,  hypothetically,  all  agents could issue  their  own  liabilities  and  have them
accepted as money by everybody else. This same argument explains why different market
structures of the banking sector, resulting in different market entry rules and in stronger or
weaker competition between banks, alter the seigniorage power of banks.
Seigniorage  is not  extracted by  agents that  only  intermediate  existing  liquidity.
Unlike commercial loan interests and like payments for inputs, interest payments on long-
term  obligations  represent  production  cost  items  against  the  company's  revenues  and,
correspondingly,  income  compensations to  both  investors  for  temporarily  parting  with
liquidity  and  to  intermediaries  for  providing  intermediation  services.  As  such,  these
payments do not involve net real resource transfers from firms to savers and intermediaries.
Bank size and seigniorage
The  way  money  enters  and  flows  through  the  circuit  entails  also  a  direct
relationship between the size of a bank and its seigniorage power. Size is here defined as
the share of a bank's  deposit base over the economy's total deposits, and includes both the
volume  of  deposits  and  the number  of depositors.  When bank  A  extends  a  loan to  a
borrower it stands a chance that, once used for payments, the newly created deposit claims
are transferred to other banks where the payees hold their deposit accounts. The smaller the
size of A, the higher the chance of the claim being transferred to other banks. When claim
transfers occur, bank A incurs open interbank debit positions which  it becomes liable to
offset when so requested by the creditor banks or by the extant payment settlement rules:
offsetting a debit position through settlement funds neutralizes the seigniorage from deposit
creation.
26Banks extend credit to  each other charging risk-sensitive interest rates and under
limits (caps) that vary  with the size and quality  of the borrowing banks.  Typically, the
smaller the size of A, the tighter the maximum net debit position that other banks accept
from A. Smaller banks, thus, have a stronger incentive than large ones to  limit money
creation and to hold  relatively larger reserve assets against their debit positions. 32 Less
stringent interbank debit caps thus lower bank demand for reserve assets. In the limit, if
banks extended unlimited credit to each other, they would have no incentive (and indeed no
reason) to hold  reserve  assets. Unlimited (and costless)  interbank  credit would be  like
having only one bank in the system, holding deposit accounts for all agents and managing
all payments across its  own books: in principle, the bank  could issue deposits  at will,
without  regard to  having to  raise  liquidity for  interbank  obligations  settlement, or  to
ensuring convertibility of its deposit liabilities into reserve assets.
In the  absence of  unlimited interbank credit, it becomes  relevant for a  bank to
expand its  size. By  expanding its  deposit base  and by  integrating  credit,  deposit, and
payment activities, the bank reduces the obligations arising from its lending and enhances
its seigniorage from money creation. By broadening its deposit base, the bank increases the
number  of payments  settled  within  its  own books  and,  ceteris  paribus,  decreases the
number and the volume of its interbank debit positions. It may increase its lending with a
lower risk  that this  will  generate deposit  transfers  to  other  banks,  and  with  a higher
probability that deposits will flow back in its own books from other banks as a result of
payment activity.
On the incentive side, unlimited interbank credit would have the same effects as full
deposit insurance or suspension of deposit convertibility in stemming the risk of run on
banks from depositors, and would eliminate restrains on deposit overissue.
The above arguments show that credit creation is not upper-bounded by deposits as
it would be if banks were pure intermediaries transferring deposits across agents. Besides
the role played by borrower-specific factors in credit supply decisions, optimum money
32 Contrast  this with  the extreme  case of a system  with  only one  bank. Money  would  circulate  as book-entries
within  the same  bank's balance  sheet. In this case,  irrespective  of how fast existing  deposits  shift  hands,  and
abstracting  from inflationary  and confidence-related  concerns,  the bank could create new money  at will,
unimpeded  by debit  offsetting  requirements.  Note that in this case  the bank would  be in a position  to extend
loans of any maturity  with no concern  about asset-liability  maturity  mismatch.  Related  to size is also the
27creation through lending in a bank credit economy is determined by each bank taking into
account its interbank obligations, its means available to discharge such obligations, and the
acceptability of its own debt claims to other banks. 33
Finally, the previous discussion on size and seigniorage suggests that banks have an
incentive to capture greater shares of the deposit market. Since this allows them to clear a
larger number of deposit transfers within their own books, banks may gain significantly
from  attaching  payment  services  to  their  lending-deposit  activity.  This  conclusion
complements Goodfriend's  (1991) argument, discussed earlier, which explains that banks
specialize  in  integrating  credit,  deposit,  and  payment  services  due  to  informational
advantages.
Banks  tend to assume  industrial  corporate  ownership  and control
Firms settle their bank debt only by transferring real resources to the banks. Real
resource transfers may include direct sales of output, payments out of profits, and transfers
of fixed asset (e.g., real estate) and equity claims. Settlements may also involve transfers of
savings borrowed from the financial market, although this solution is not sustainable over
time.
Of the nondebt settlement instruments, direct output sales make a  small share of
total  transfers,  while  fixed  asset  claim  transfers  find  a  natural  bound  in  the  firms'
endowment of marketable assets. Thus, in the long run, firms  settle their debt by using
gross profits and/or by selling equity to the banks or the public. Equity sales allow firms to
transfer to the banks  claims on their future income as well  as control over  their  future
income-earming  capacity.
For given (desired) levels of profitability, using profits to settle bank debt requires
that  firms  extract  larger  surpluses  from  input-owners  or  that  they  use  inputs  more
intensively,  raising  productivity.  Using  profits  may  thus  be  hampered  by  mutually
degree of competition  among banks, which limits seigniorage  by restraining the equilibrium level of the
interest  rate on bank loans.
33 A contrario,  this point could be taken  to imply  that, to the extent  that banks ultimately  have to mind about
preserving  the convertibility  of their own money  into reserve assets,  even a free banking  regime would  pose
limits to money creation.  These would derive from self-imposed  restraints set by individual  banks on their
own lending  volumes.  I am grateful  to J. Hanson  for emphasizing  this point  in conversation.
28inconsistent  distributional  plans  of  firms  and  input-owners,  rigidities  to  productivity
growth, and slow business activity.
When profits  are constrained by any of these factors, firms'  demand for liquidity
driven by interest debt payment requirements needs to result in equity transfers from the
firms' original owners to the banks and/or the public. A market for corporate control would
evolve which might take various forms depending on the institutional characteristics of the
economy  involved:  where  banks  dominate the  financial  system,  enterprise  ownership
claims tend to accumulate in bank portfolios, with the claims likely being exchanged in
exclusive (bilateral) settings under noncompetitive and nontransparent conditions. On the
other hand,  in  economies  with  more market-based financial  systems,  enterprise equity
would be absorbed by the public, directly or indirectly (through institutional investors), in
much more competitive and transparent contexts.
The market for corporate control would also be influenced by the business cycle.
By  compressing  corporate  profits,  economic  slowdowns  and  recessions  should  favor
noncompetitive transfers  of ownership  from  firms to  banks,  since  exclusive bank-firm
relations make it relatively easier and cheaper for both to convert debt into equity within
the same bank  portfolios.  With sustained economic activity, however,  larger  corporate
profits and the public's  greater appetite for risk and need for risk diversification should
encourage  transfers  of  ownership  to  households,  other  firms,  and  nonbank  financial
institutions through competitive market mediations.
But whether corporate ownership is prevalently transferred to banks or to the public
may  have  a  different  impact  on  money  supply.  As  shown  earlier,  if  firms  transfer
ownership to the banks, the interest debt is settled directly as debt is exchanged for stocks
and no additional money is needed in the circuit to make interest payments. On the other
hand,  if  corporate  ownership  shifts to  the public  and  to  nonbank  (financial  and non-
financial) entities, interest payments need to continue to be made  from the firms to the
banks, requiring new money to be injected in the system.
295. Policy implications: reducing risks should not kill the banks
Banks  create money  and lend it to  those  who use  it to  mobilize  resources  and
produce output, before new  incomes (and  savings) are generated.  In  fact, banks  create
money against future incomes deriving from the production financed with the new money.
Bank money creation thus  entails a forward-looking  process  that moves  from  credit to
output to debt service. To the extent that the money advanced as credit is backed up by real
output  ex  post,  this  mechanism  provides  the  economy  with  a  greater  potential  for
mobilizing real resources than one where real resources are needed upfront to back up new
credit.  This  argument  is  the  same  as  Schumpeter's  and  carries  with  it  important
implications for the role of banks in economic development.
On the risk side, a system where banks can create money is definitely riskier than if
banks were  to  fully cover their  credit. Because banks  issue  liquid liabilities to  finance
illiquid activities, they bear significant illiquidity risks, they themselves generate risks and
are vulnerable to risks originating elsewhere in the economy. Also, due to their large intra-
sector and inter-sector open  positions, banks may transmit  shocks across the  economy.
Governments, therefore, introduce  rules to prevent such risks, especially with  a view to
averting systemic consequences.
Given  the tradeoff  between  cost-efficiency  and  risk  associated  with  generating
production  finance,  it is important for policymakers to  make  sure that the  measures to
protect the economy from systemic risks strike a right enough balance between the two
terms of the tradeoff. This is important most of all for developing economies where risk-
prevention  policies  from regulators  may result in  high  costs  for generating  production
finance.
Three issues are taken up in this section to assess how public policy to reduce risks
interact with the incentives of banks  as money producers. The first  deals with  payment
settlement rules, the second discusses the narrow banking proposal, and the third looks at
deposit insurance.
30Payment settlement rules: some may be too costly
By  supporting banks'  mutual  debit  positions  arising  from  deposit transfers
(payments),  interbank  credit in a circuit  process allows  banks to create the money  necessary
to finance economic  activity. 34 Each bank must be sufficiently  creditworthy  to get credit
from the other  banks and, in tum, must be willing to extend credit to the others (if these are
sufficiently  creditworthy)  as deposits  move across  their books.
In the absence  of distortions,  lending  to other  banks places each bank's capital  at risk
and gives banks an incentive  to monitor each other's creditworthiness  and risk of money
overissue.  In other words, interbank credit provides each bank with market incentives  to
preserve its own credit standing and to ensure that other banks preserve their own asset
quality.  Banks are thus induced  to price interbank  credit based on the risk of the borrowing
banks and to limit their exposures  (or deny credit  altogether)  to overissuing  banks.
Different payment settlement  rules may affect differently the cost to the banking
system  to finance  economic  activity  and to induce  discipline  into banks.
Under correspondent banking arrangements, banks  hold  accounts with  their
correspondents,  through  which they clear (incoming/outcoming)  payments ., and settle net
end-of-day  balances  on the books of the central  bank. Correspondents  extend  credit  to their
client banks and other correspondents  through credit lines or overdraft agreements  under
pre-set terms and limits. Up to these limits, they commit to make good all incoming
payments from their clients until new funds arrive on the client accounts and credits are
repaid. 35 The cost of money creation  is determined  by the specific  types of interbank  credit
agreements. The reciprocity of  such agreements and the  adoption of netting contracts
between correspondents  can make the cost of interbank  credit much cheaper  than if banks
were to  settle their  (gross) mutual obligations in  central bank money (see below).
Correspondent  banks have incentives  to assess,  monitor, and control the risk of their client
banks. Due to the nature of their relationships  with client banks, they possess appropriate
information  channels  to perform  risk monitoring.
34  Smith and Weber (1998) show, analytically  and historically,  the welfare superiority  of payment systems
with  interbank  credit.
35Assume  that  banks A and B hold correspondent  accounts  with one another  and agree  on mutual  credit  lines.
If A's borrower  pays B's client out of his loan account,  A runs a liability  vis-a-vis  B. Bank  A may finance  its
31Under multilateral net settlement rules, banks are required periodically to settle in
central bank money their multilateral net payment obligations  outstanding at the time of
settlement. This requirement does not prevent banks from using (free of cost) interbank
credit during the interval between settlement cycles to create the money needed to finance
transactions. In fact, net interbank debit (credit) positions might in principle be very small
and yet  the banks'  mutual  gross  obligations  could be  as  large  as necessary  to  satisfy
deposit  transfers  of  any  size.  Multilateral  netting  rules  thus  provide  an  economically
convenient way for banks to generate production finance. On the risk side, they may not
necessarily  structure  bank  relationships  such  as  to  provide  banks  with  the  mutual
information channels available under correspondent banking. Still, rules can be designed to
strengthen the  incentives for banks  to peer-monitor  against money  overissue  and  asset
quality  deterioration,  including  interbank  liquidity-  and  loss-sharing  cooperative
agreements that make banks liable to take up a share of the liquidity needs or of the losses
deriving from any of them failing to settle.
Under gross settlement rules, banks  are required  to settle  each  (gross) interbank
deposit transfer in central bank money. Gross settlement virtually eliminates settlement risk
as well as the possibility of systemic transmission of the failure  of  individual banks  to
settle. But this comes at a cost. Recent studies have focused on the efficiency costs of gross
settlement  rules, 36 including  payment  gridlock  problems  and  suboptimal  intertemporal
consumption effects (Kahn and Roberds, 1999).
Circuit theory adds significantly to the cost list. The gross settlement requirement
implies that no deposit claim can be issued to borrowers and used for payments if it is not
fully backed by central bank money. In other words, banks can issue and mobilize deposits
only if they possess already enough real resources to back up  the new circulation.  This
tightens the resource constraint on production finance generation. To be  sure, banks can
borrow/lend central bank  money  from/to  each other but,  although  this  allows  them to
economize on scarce reserves, it does not alter the implication that - for the economy as a
whole - the real resources needed to borrow/purchase central bank money must pre-exist to
bank deposits.
liability by drawing  on its credit line with B. The same  B can do with its payments to A. In fact, the two
banks can create  money  up to the limit  of their mutual  credit  lines,  with  no central  bank money  involvement.
36 See Kahn and Roberds (1998) for a review of the literature and a contribution to the issue.
32Thus, gross settlement rules replace a bank credit economy where banks can create
money by  exchanging  cheaper (and mutually cost-offsetting) IOUs with  a  more costly
cash-in-advance  economy where  banks  face  a  real  resource  constraint  on  generating
production  finance, that  is,  where  the  money they  create must  be  backed  up  by real
resources ex ante, rather than ex post when new output has been produced.
The cost of gross settlement rules can be reduced, and settlement risk satisfactorily
contained, by combining features of netting and correspondent banking in  some kind of
hybrid  arrangements where  a number of larger banks  would  act as correspondents and
clearinghouses for smaller client banks, establish reciprocal interbank credit relations, and
hold  settlement accounts with  a  central agent. Each correspondent/clearinghouse would
clear the payments  of  its  client banks  within  its  own books  and  deal with  the  other
correspondents/clearinghouses for  the  payments between  their  respective  client banks.
Only net balances between correspondents/clearinghouses could be settled in central bank
money either at the end of the day or at intervals during the day. The net balances between
each correspondent/clearinghouse and its client banks could be covered by interbank credit
lines or overdraft facilities (subject to limits) that would reduce the cost to smaller banks
for production financing.
The hybrid arrangements would make production finance generation cheaper than
gross  settlement rules,  while  they would make  market  discipline  on  risk  management
stronger  than  under  netting  or  correspondent  banking.  In  particular,  the  large
correspondent/clearinghouse banks would exert a strong disciplinarian role on the smaller
client banks and among themselves.
Is Narrow Banking a good idea?
Risk reduction lies at the heart of the various narrow banking proposals periodically
recurring  in  the  literature  and  the  policy  debate.  These  proposals  aim  at  removing
illiquidity and insolvency risks from the banking business by requiring banks to back up
their demand deposit liabilities with safe short-term assets. 37 Noting that the magnitude of
such assets outside the banking system exceeds the magnitude of banks'  demand deposit
37 The proposal  was first introduced  by Simons  (1934, 1935). See also references  in Wallace (1996) and
Thakor (1996). For a discussion, see Goodhart (1987).
33liabilities, the advocates of this approach assume that there is an unsatisfied demand from
the public for safe assets that banks do not match because of existing distortive incentives -
such  as  deposit  insurance,  government  regulation,  or  bailout  commitments  - which
encourage banks to hold illiquid portfolios. 38
In fact, one should wonder whether such a radical approach would not end up by
killing the essential  function that banks perform in capitalist  economies. Wallace (1996)
shows that the narrow banking solution eliminates the role of banking altogether. As he
puts it, ". ..using narrow banking to cope with the potential problems of banking illiquidity
is analogous to reducing automobile accidents by limiting automobile speeds to zero" (p.
9).
Such conclusion is only  reinforced by  circuit analysis. The narrow-bank  concept
conflicts with the understanding of the bank  as a money producer and  circuit-starter. If
banks can create money through lending to finance production, a high leverage is intrinsic
to their incentive structure whereby liquid debt claims (deposits) stand necessarily against
less liquid assets (loans to firms).
Under  narrow banking, banks  cannot finance production.  But  then: How  would
money  be  injected  in  the economy  under  narrow  banking?  How  would  production  be
financed? What would be the net social welfare cost from financing production differently
than under traditional banking?
One way to finance production under narrow banking would be through specialized
nonbank financial intermediaries. The central bank creates money through money market
operations. Nonbanks  could borrow money directly  from the  central  bank  or from  the
money  market,  and  transfer  it  to  the producing  firms.  This  solution  raises  the  same
limitations of gross settlement rules. 39
The  social  welfare  implications  of  financing  production  though  nonbank
intermediaries, thus, depend on the way money is made available to the economy. Under
central bank  lending or money market operations, the intermediaries must  have enough
38 See,  for instance,  Kareken  (1985).
39 In this respect,  gross settlement  rules may be seen as a different  way to achieve  a kind of narrow banking:
whereas the latter requires a  100-percent  reserve on deposit stocks, gross settlement rules impose a  100-
percent  reserve  requirement  on the  flows deriving  from  deposit  transfers  (payments).
34collateral or securities to raise the reserves needed to back up their lending. As discussed,
this constraints production, raises the cost of generating production finance.
Under narrow banking, production can be financed also in an alternative way. Firms
may  sell  liabilities  in  the  financial market  bearing  maturity  terms  consistent  with  the
production cycle they finance. Even assuming that all firms can do so, two main problems
arise: first, new production must be financed with the stock of money already existing in
the economy; to the extent that such money is somebody's  credit  (either central bank's
credit or credit from whoever has originally purchased reserves from the central bank), its
reutilization in new activities diverts it from re-flowing to its original creditor, the interest
rate and the velocity of money would both rise as new production needs  financing. The
central bank  accommodates must  accommodate the new money  demand with  the same
consequences as above.
Second, in the  absence of liquidity transformation by banks,  production  finance
under narrow banking requires  savers to hold  in their portfolio  larger shares of illiquid
claims on the firms. Unless this happens, either some production  plans go unfulfilled or
new money has to come from the central bank, with again the same effects as above.
The conclusion is that whereas narrow banks may emerge as a market response to
an  unsatisfied  demand  for  safe  assets,  thereby  filling  an  incomplete  segment  of  the
financial market, it would be wrong to transform by decree all traditional banks into narrow
banks  as this  would  create a  severe market  incompleteness:  banks  as highly  leveraged
institutions are necessary to reduce the cost to generate production finance.
Should deposits be insured?
Governments  concerned  with  systemic  risks  may  resort  to  deposit  guarantee
mechanisms  to protect  depositors (especially smaller  ones) from the risk of losing their
money if their banks go bust. If banks are seen as providers of liquidity insurance services
to  depositors  under  a  sequential  service  constraint  (Diamond  and  Dybvig,  1983),  it
apparently pays to prevent banks  from the risk of being run  by depositors  (for right or
wrong reasons) by introducing an insurance that guarantees the promised returns to all who
withdraw their money. This insurance eliminates the incentives for depositors to participate
in a bank run and thus preserves confidence in the banks.
35The merits of deposit insurance have been questioned on grounds of moral hazard.
Diamond and Rajan (1998,  1999) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991)  argue that bank runs
have good incentive  effects on banks as they induce bankers  to  commit to  be credible
debtors  (see  section 2).  Deposit insurance neutralizes  such  incentives  and weakens  the
discipline that banks derive from their fragile capital structure.
In the circuit framework discussed above, deposit insurance can be shown to have
even more serious perverse effects on the banks'  incentive structure. When bank deposits
are protected with  insurance, the incentive for banks to manage  the credit risk  on their
interbank lending is weakened. This is not just because the commitment of each bank to be
a credible debtor to  its own depositors  is  lessened by  the  insurance  coverage but  also
because, as a lender to other banks,  each bank knows that the borrowing banks  are not
subject to runs from their depositors if their quality deteriorates. In fact, banks may even
attract  new  deposits  if  they  perceive  their  own  risks  to  be  threatening  their
liquidity/solvency position. Such incentive alteration may worsen the quality of interbank
credits and bank peer-monitoring, leading to wrong pricing  of interbank  credit facilities,
too generous interbank credit limits, and inadequate risk control. This would likely result in
over-extension of credit to risky banks and, ultimately, in an inaccurate market selection of
banks. And since risk-sensitive interbank lending is crucial to support the banks'  ability to
safely create money  via loans  to  firms  and to  select  best  banks  in  the  long run,  poor
management of interbank credit risk may result in individual banks overissuing money and
financing lesser quality firms.
In the circuit framework, therefore, deposit insurance not only  tends to raise the
moral hazard of individual banks, it debilitates the capacity of the whole banking system to
enforce market discipline upon and within itself.
One could experiment with the idea of having depositors  insuring  their deposits
against the risk of bank failures, by buying policies from private insurers. As the insurers
would be  forced to  correlate policy premiums with  bank risks  (certainly under stronger
pressure and with better information and expertise than government bureaucrats in state-run
deposit insurance finds),  they would have an incentive to monitor banks closely, thereby
exerting  discipline on  the banks'  risk behavior.  On the  other hand,  market-determined
premiums  for insurance would lead depositors  to select and monitor  their deposit banks
36more carefully. Of course, the idea requires a much thorough investigation but it essentially
emphasizes the need for depositors and banks to evaluate and manage risks free of moral
hazard, whereas the current deposit insurance schemes tend precisely to do the reverse.
6. Will banks remain special?
This  question arises  spontaneously after observing that  almost everywhere in the
industrialized  world,  over  the  last  two  decades,  traditional  banking  (deposit/lending)
activities have lost relevance in quantitative terms. Such loss is the result of the impressive
growth of commercial paper markets and of the money market mutual funds thrift industry,
the increasing ownership of banks by securities firms and commercial enterprises, and the
proliferation  of  quasi-monies  or money-substitutes  with  associated  transaction  account
facilities comparable to bank-issued transaction balances. Correspondingly, banks have had
to diversify their activity from traditional deposit/lending to nonbank  intermediation and
financial services provision. 40
For many, the quantitative loss reflects a qualitative change: traditional banking has
lost importance vis-a-vis other forms of financial intermediation, and banks - as we have
come to know them so far - will either disappear or become practically indistinguishable
from other financial institutions.  Can banks remain  special  in the  future? Will  they be
replaced by nonbank intermediaries? Or will they have to become nonbank intermediaries
to  survive in  the new world?  What will happen to  them  in the  new  age of  electronic
money?
Are banks  still relevant?
In  the  industrial  world,  following  financial  liberalization,  nonbank  financial
activities have subtracted considerable market shares to commercial banks. Increases have
been observed in the market share of institutions holding securities instead of loans. At the
same time, domestic banking sectors have undergone profound reorganization with banks
consolidating into fewer and larger units.
40  For an analysis of the decline  of traditional  banking in the US, see Edwards and Mishkin (1995). See
Arestis and Howells (1999) and Howells and Hussein (1997) for evidence on  the UK. For a  recent
international  analysis  and interpretation,  see Allen and Santomero  (1999).
37An interesting interpretation of the disinternediation problem has been provided by
the  core-deposit  theory  of  Berlin  and  Mester  (1996)  recalled  earlier:  as  banks  have
increasingly been forced to pay market rates on  an increasing  share of their funds, core
deposits  have  shrunk  and  multi-period  relationship  lending  has  become  less  and  less
feasible, causing banks to  lose  some of their  comparative  advantage vis-a-vis  nonbank
intennediaries. 41
Table 1. Banking and financial indicators for G7 countries
1980  1985  1990  1994




Deposits  25.0  22.1  20.9  19.4
Loans  27.5  24.1  23.2  22.0
Equities  12.3  14.3  15.2  17.8
Bonds  10.7  12.4  11.2  13.8
Household deposits  45.5  40.3  35.6  31.6
(%Fin. claims)
Loans to firms  43.9  41.7  39.9  36.6
(% Tot financing to firms)
Source: Calculations on BIS data.
The  circuit  approach  suggests  an  alternative  interpretation  that  accounts
simultaneously  for  bank  disintermediation  and  consolidation.  Since  liberalization  has
caused the demand for core deposits to decline, individual banks - especially smaller ones -
have faced a higher risk of running increasing interbank open debit positions as a result of
"'  The concept of core deposits must be used cautiously. In a circuit process, increases in the interest elasticity
of the demand for deposits do not imply destruction of existing deposits but simply their increasing velocity
of circulation. In principle, to the extent that banks extend sufficient credit to each other and/or that their size
allows them to minimize interbank exposures, the decline of core deposits should not upset lending.
38lending. Banks have thus started to run higher reserve holding costs against the risk of
defaulting on their interbank obligations. This has put pressure on many of them to reduce
lending  (causing  disintermediation),  to  increase  their  deposit  market  share  (through
mergers and acquisitions) so as to capture larger re-flows of deposits from lending, and to
expand the range of financial services provided to their clients alternative to core deposits.
Unsuccessful banks, on the other hand, have been forced out of the market, again leading to
industry consolidation.
Moreover,  the  advent  of  competitive  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  has
facilitated the life of investing enterprises seeking to raise investment funding from the
capital market. This has lowered savers' demand for core deposits vis-a-vis securities and
equity instruments, while  improving the capacity of producing firms to  appropriate the
money needed for debt service at circuit-end by accessing the capital market. As a result,
banks may have had lesser need to refinance the original short-term commercial loans and
may have reduced their commercial lending.
But, can we imagine a world where nonbank intermediaries replace banks entirely?
This question brings us back to  a world dominated by narrow banks,  discussed earlier.
Suppose that such intermediaries are securities dealers with collateralized access to central
bank funds, who can redistribute liquidity among themselves through the money market.
Suppose also that all firms have access to securities dealers and that bank deposits are
issued by,  and held at, narrow banks.  Deposits are used both  as  liquid assets and  for
transaction purposes,  and  all  payments  are managed  by  the  narrow  banks.  Nonbank
intermediaries finance new production by accessing the central bank or the money market,
and funds are transferred through book entries at narrow banks.
The problem with this setup is that since all finance to production requires central
bank money, and all borrowings from the central bank must be collateralized, securities
dealers need to fully back up their loans to production with capital: a much less efficient
solution than lending to  the economy through highly leveraged institutions like banks,
which can finance loans by issuing uncollateralized debt and only use a small capital base
to support lending.
Alternatively, assuming that enough liquidity is already in the system, the nonbank
intermediaries could finance new production by  issuing securities to  the public with  a
39maturity  structure  similar  to that of the assets financed  by them. But this would deprive  the
markets of the liquidity services that banks provide by transforming maturities. On the
other hand, if investors  wish to stay liquid and keep their claims with the narrow banks in
lieu of holding  nonbank liabilities,  production  finance  would not be available in sufficient
quantity since narrow banks are (by definition)  prohibited from lending to firms. It thus
tums out that banks allow for an efficient completion  of the economy's financial  markets;
they  complement  intermediaries  in an essential  way and cannot  be replaced  by them.
To be sure, financial and regulatory  innovations  enable bank money to circulate
more rapidly and nonbanks to issue quasi-monies  and to create bank credit substitutes.
40Box 2. Are mutual fund shares real money?
Mutual  funds  pool savings  from many  individuals  in exchange  for (market-valued)  shares  in the
fuds,  and invest them in various activities.  Money  market mutual funds invest in high-grade.
short-term  securities  that offer market  returns on share accounts  that permit check-writing  and
wire fund transfer  privileges.
A close  inspection  at money  market  mutual  funds,  however,  shows that they do not make  banks
and their money-creation  function any less special, although they allow bank deposits to
circulate faster in the economy: First of all, when mutual funds issue shares they receive in
exchange  bank deposits that they iitialy  hold with their bank or banking  department:  deposits
are not replaced but move from individual  to mutual fund portfolios.  Second, when mutual
funds invest in  securities, they actually transer  the deposits onginally purchased to the
accounts  of the securities  issuers  who,  in turn, can access  the borrowed  deposits to finance  their
expenses: deposits are  not  replaced in  lending and  spending operations. Third, when
shareholders  instruct their mutual fund to make payments out of their share accounts, the
mutual fund draws down its bank deposits and transfer them to the payees' bank accounts:
deposits are not replaced  as transaction  devices and payments  take place as deposit  trfers  on
bank books.  Of course, the mutual  fund  can finance  its payment  obligation  through  a credit line
from its correspondent  bank, or it can simply  realize its securities  investment, yet both options
stil  involve bank deposit transfers, Mutual funds do not create money; they only transfer it
from savers  to users.
Mutal  funds  with many shareholders  can exploit  the law of large numbers and economize  on
the deposits,  that individuals  would held in their absence.  But banks stand ready to purchase
securities from mutual funds (or to lend deposits to them) if the funds do not have emnugh
liquidity  to cover  for their payment  obligations:  mutual  funds  need  banks to stay liquid.
However, to the extent that quasi-monies do not replace deposits as means of payment (see
Box 2), nonbank credit  substitutes can only serve to channel existing bank money from
savers  to  capital  users  more efficiently.  Replacing banks  with  nonbank  internediaries
would constrain the productive  potential  of the  economy  and make  production finance
more costly to generate.
Is production  finance  still a major source  of banking  business?
Even  some  circuitists  today  observe  that  the  significance  of  bank  lending  to
industrial and commercial undertakings has all but declined in  some advanced industrial
countries relative to  household credit  to consumption and  second-hand asset purchases,
including for speculative trading. But this does not diminish the role (and the relevance) of
41banks  as producers  of money,  although it modifies the  standard circuit  flow of funds
discussed earlier.
In  the  case  of  consumer  credit,  high  industrial  productivity  growth  requires
nowadays ways  to  expand  and  accelerate consumption.  As  households  are willing  to
commit part of their  future incomes to  fund higher  current  consumption beyond  their
current incomes, bank consumer credit allows firms not only to appropriate enough money
to pay  off their debt at circuit-end (as in the standard circuit process), but also to make
extra profits  corresponding to  household  current dis-savings.  As  corporate  profits  are
invested in the capital market, banks can borrow them at maturities that match those on
their consumer loans and balance their position. In this new flow of funds, firms are the net
savers (instead of households) while banks are both suppliers of fresh money (to firms and
households) and borrowers of funds in the capital market (from the firms).
In  the case  of credit  to  second-hand asset  purchases  by  households  (including
durables, houses, and financial assets), banks issue new deposits and finance second-hand
asset acquisitions that in turn generate incomes and new funds to the capital market. Banks
can then refinance their positions in the capital market as loan accounts are drawn down on
borrowers' payment orders. In this case, the households are the fund users while the sellers
of the assets and the intermediaries involved provide the savings by investing their profits
from asset sales and intermediation services, respectively, in the capital market. As money
suppliers, banks allow deposits to accommodate the higher demand for funds generated by
the increasing volume of financial transactions driven by trade of existing asset stocks.
In all the above cases, the efficiency of the economy's  financial infrastructure (in
particular, in allowing rapid fund transfers across the economy) is key to ensure than banks
refinance their positions in the market promptly and smoothly.
Will electronics put banks out of business?
What is the future of banks with the advent of electronic money? For reason of
clarity, the concept of e-money here used rules out innovations introduced with the only
purpose to move around bank money more quickly - such as home banking, electronic bill
paying, ETF, and ATMs - and refers exclusively to computer money-forms that represent
42liabilities  of nonbank  entities,  or  special segregated  bank  accounts,  and  that  actually
substitute for conventional monies. 42
E-money is initially issued to clients by network operators on network accounts in
exchange for conventional bank deposits. The e-issuers hold the original bank deposits,
which  are perfectly matched by  what the e-issuers owe to  their  clients. Assuming full
acceptability of the new money instrument and full trade security, the e-money is used by
cyberspace shoppers to finance purchases in the e-malls. Merchants are paid in e-money
and  convert their  e-receipts  into  conventional bank  deposits.  Accordingly,  their  bank
accounts are credited, while shoppers' bank accounts are drawn down equivalently.
At some point, the e-issuers may start offering e-deposit facilities, so that merchants
can either hold their e-value with the issuers or use it for further payments in the net. This
could extend to other payers and payees along the trade chain. Thus, once issued, the e-
money stock could in principle never return to the conventional banking system; it would
become an indefinite leakage for it and grow independently of it.
Are banks to disappear in this scenario?
Quite the opposite. Even though individual banks might be unable to make it in the
new world, banking as such would see its own rebirth - though under new disguise. As the
new e-deposits become accepted in the system, some e-issuers would face an incentive to
move away from fully backing e-deposits with conventional deposits and start using the
float to make e-loans. Further down the road, as the size and reputation of the e-issuers
grow and consolidate throughout the net community, they would have an incentive to lend
e-deposits by  acknowledging new  debts  (in  addition  to  existing  e-deposit  claims)  and
promising to honor them as the e-loan accounts are drawn down: history  would repeat
itself.
Conventional banking would  be  replicated  in  the cyberspace  and  any nonbank
entity aiming to issue e-deposits in the cyber-circuit would have to possess at least those
same skills than bankers have developed for centuries when dealing with more material
money stuff. E-banks would still be special: they would create e-money by lending their
own e-debt and will remain a very distinct specie for a while longer.
42 For an extensive  presentations  of the many  issues  relating  to e-money,  see Solomon  (1997).
437. Banks, finance,  and economic  development
Banks provide the raw material for a monetary production  economy to work and
grow (regardless of the technological form of money).
The  positive  impact of  finance  on  economic  growth  has  received  significant
empirical support during the nineties, starting with the contribution by King and Levine
(1993). Research showed also that counties with  more developed  banking systems and
liquid  capital  markets  have  experienced  the  most  rapid  growth  (Demirgiiu-Kunt and
Levine,  1996), confirming  the  importance  of  complementarity  between  banking  and
nonbank financial intermediation. 43
In the following, based on the elements derived from the circuit approach and using
a highly-stylized description, I will digress on how banking and financial development may
determine various  efficiency/stability configurations across different stages  of economic
development. I will also consider the possible role of banking and finance as technology
evolves, in the light of what seem to be some of the most pressing conditions that need to
be in place for progress to deliver its benefits to largest possible communities of people.
Banks, finance, and economic development: past and present
Early industrialism:  new industries,  few banks
Early in the process of industrialization - as in  18-century Europe - economies are
dominated by  manufacturing  firms.  Family-owned  firms  specialize  in  profit-oriented
production  and  commercialization  of  commodities. Production  and  trade  are  financed
though issues of bank-guaranteed commercial paper.
While the acquisition of the capital goods used in production is funded with the
owners'  own  funds  and  with  business  internally  generated  surpluses,  capital  goods
producers finance their inventories through commercial credit  from input suppliers  and
contract sales. Banks have a very limited role.
43 For a comprehensive  analysis  of the role of financial  development  for economic  growth,  see Levine  (1997).
For  recent  empirical  works  on  fnancial  structure  and  economic  development  see
www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm
44Firms determine the total level of resource employment for the given production
technology. Since they finance the acquisition of capital goods internally, they - as a group
- determine the share of the economy's resources allocated to consumption and investment.
To  the  extent  that  labor market  negotiations set  nominal  wages  and  trading  involves
commodities already produced (that is, no  forward contracts  are  allowed), firms (as  a
group) also determine the volume of output that they appropriate at circuit-end.
Workers'  saving decisions that turn out to be inconsistent with  firms'  production
plans prompt commodity price adjustments to the point where all money spent by the firms
is appropriated  by the firms themselves at circuit-end.
The circuit process of the early industrial economies is rudimentary and relatively
stable overall (to the extent that, and for as long as, its distributional effects are accepted by
the society). The limited role of banks as money suppliers constrains production and saving
generation, while capital accumulation is limited by the lack of organized finance for long-
term investment and  depends almost exclusively on the capitalists'  sources of personal
wealth. Bank seigniorage is low or nonexistent, there is no transfer of ownership rights
from firms to banks or the public, and equity capital is the domain of a restricted class of
owners.
Banks  step  in...
The integrated role of banking and finance evolves when the demand for capital
equipment and labor inputs intensifies and financial needs exceed personal wealth - as in
Europe and America of late 1800s-early 1900s.
Banks support increasing production  by  lending new  deposit claims.  Moreover,
bank  loan and  deposit contracts  are cost-efficient in  environments  with  poor  financial
infrastructure, scarce information, and a high demand for safe and stable returns on money
from savers: banks become the main financial players.
But since the demand for credit to produce capital goods increases and the supply
and demand for capital goods and financial capital specialize across different groups of
agents, the risk rises that at circuit-end firms fail to appropriate the money borrowed from
the banks. Also, as the demand for financial capital outgrows internally-generated funds
and  the agent  investment horizons  become  more  extended,  investing  enterprises need
45increasingly to  rely on a stable supply of long-term funds and to minimize  uncertainty
about their ability to attract and retain funding.
To assist the investing enterprises, banks develop investment banking and financial
intermediation functions. With capital markets in their infancy and relatively few (as well
as unsophisticated and not well-informed) large investors, banks  are well positioned to
draw long-term funds from savers and transfer them to investing enterprises on acceptable
terms. As more bank credit is injected into production, financial intermediation provides
investing enterprises with patient money. Once used  to  fund  investments, such money
enables producing  firms to  stay current on  their bank  debt service obligations  at each
circuit round close: financial intermediaries complements banks in an essential way.
However, with increasing specialization and decentralization of both  commodity
production  and  financial  services provision,  firms  as  a  group  lose  control  of  output
allocation to consumption and investment, the profitability  of individual firms becomes
more volatile, and the net real resource transfer from firms to banks (due to seigniorage)
increases.
Banks and firms thus grow a strong common interest to protect  firms'  cash-flow
generation, and  develop  exclusive relationships whereby  firms  gain  from  banks  stable
access to long-term capital - even at times of adverse contingencies - in exchange for equity
positions. Exclusive relationships give banks considerable rent-extraction power over the
firms being financed. Universal banks emerge with increasing control of firms and manage
to clump firms operating at different vertical levels of the same commodity sectors under
single parent entities, with the purpose to stabilize the flow of funds from savers to end-
users and ensure regular bank credit recovery at circuit-end.
The system  may become more  stable overall as  firms  face a  lower  risk of not
appropriating the full money at circuit-end, and circuit closure is more safeguarded. In the
long run, however, exclusive relationships lead to market information opaqueness, illiquid
investment positions, restrictions on competition in both the real and financial sectors, and
lesser  reliability  of  the  price  system  as  an  allocation  device.  Eventually,  exclusive
relationships  weaken  the  incentives  to  efficiency,  technological  innovation,  and  new
industry creation (Rajan and Zingales, 1999).
46...until the state takes it all
To a large extent, the expanding role of the state in finance - as experienced in the
industrial countries after the 1930s and almost everywhere in the world in the aftermath of
the second world war (with the exception of the United States which remained a market-
oriented economy) - replaces investment banking at the core of the financial side of the
circuit, both  by  directly absorbing  savings and  by  centrally managing  funds allocation
through financial repression, directed and subsidized lending, public money transfers, and
control of financial institutions.
With  the  state  acting  as  a  financial  intermediary,  fund-savers  become  less
concerned with the reputation of private-sector financial institutions, as they place savings
with  state-owned or  state-controlled banks  under  the implicit  guarantee  of  (perceived)
unlimited  solvency  of  the  public  sector. Also,  the  large  share  of  public  spending  on
aggregate output stabilizes the flow of funds that firms need to appropriate at circuit-end.
Under state finance the (actual) cost of funds bears little or no relation to risk- and
information-related factors. Fund rationing is decided centrally by the government, based
on macroeconomic or political policy objectives, and irrespective of risk factors.
In extreme forms of state finance, no seigniorage is extracted by the banks from the
enterprises. In fact, as the state advances money to firms at below-equilibrium  (typically
negative) real  interest  rates  to  push  production  and  resource  employment  above their
market  equilibrium,  the net  real  resource transfer  from  the  firms  to  the  banks  is  low
(negative).  No  market  for  corporate  control  emerges  since  the  state  guarantees  the
industrial firms (especially the large ones) against circuit breakdowns and insolvency.
By  directing  the  mobilization  and  allocation  of  funds,  state-controlled  finance
ensures greater stability of fund supply to end-users and producing firms but, for the same
reason, it causes less efficient selection of investing enterprises and higher moral hazard
from borrowers. The state role as a financial intermediary severs producers'  and investors'
decisions from the profit motive. This results in a highly leveraged corporate sector and in
large and inefficient investments with poor output performances.
In more extreme forms, this situation is typical of corporatist and centrally planned-
economies,  where  the  circuit operates  under  state  control.  Liquidity  for  production  is
created at  will by  a  centralized banking  system,  funds are  funneled  back to  the state
47through  forced  savings  and  taxation,  and  from  there  they  are  allocated  to  investing
enterprises to finance capital goods purchases and ensure circuit closure.
Historically, both these economic models have proven  effective in delivering the
required output for limited periods of time, while they have irreversibly faded in the long-
run. Their success is possible when the meta-economic objectives of the society (such as
preparing  for war, restoring order  after periods  of economic upheaval,  or affirming the
supremacy of central planning)  are strong enough to mobilize  the necessary  individual
efforts beyond commensurate individual economic rewards, and the output required from
the collective effort addresses specific needs (e.g.,  building up heavy  industry) that are
accepted as absolute priorities by the collectivity.
As the two conditions weaken, both systems turn unable to preserve the necessary
steam to production: the circuit is deprived of the capacity to allocate funds to best uses,
and circuit closure can only be  achieved at the cost of larger  fiscal deficits  and higher
inflation.
The "triumph of the small investor"44
The economic efficiency and welfare losses resulting from the failure of centralized
models to reconcile individual efforts and rewards call for a correction of the economy's
incentive structure. This is accomplished by repositioning  the circuit on a decentralized-
decisions  setting.  Such route  has  been  followed by  the  industrialized  countries  and  a
growing number of emerging economies over the last two decades, in particular in response
to the need for restoring correct financial incentives.
Banks are allowed to compete in the markets for deposits  and credit, to step into
new markets,  and  to  expand their range of  services to  clients.  Nonbanks issue  money
substitutes  and  provide payment  services.  Capital markets  develop  owing  to  financial
infrastructure development and entry of institutional investors. Competition leads the latter
to  calibrate their  investment  strategy on  savers'  risk-return  preferences,  while  efficient
financial  infrastructure  allows  small  savers  to  directly  enter  the  financial  markets  as
investors (as is today the case in the United States). Small investors are increasingly well
placed to influence, with their investment choices, the institutional investor strategies due
44I take this title from Chemow  (1997),  which  inspires  much of this subsection.
48to strong competition and investor-oriented laws and regulatory systems. They may rely on
fast improving and increasingly safer technologies and infrastructure to move their own
funds in  the capital  market  at decreasing transaction costs  and  based  on better  quality
information and best profit opportunities and underlying risks.
Financial decentralization raises both the risk sensitivity of small investors and their
influence on the  financial resource allocation process. Competitive  financial investment
institutions  seek  to  achieve and  retain  all the  flexibility  needed  to  rapidly  adjust their
portfolios and investment strategies to changes in market conditions and small investors'
preferences. Information  disclosure from market participants  and attentive regulation and
supervision of their behavior take hold as individual supply functions of investable funds
become  more  sensitive  to  profit  opportunities  and  risk  factors.  This  complicates  the
survival of exclusive  bank-firm relationships  and, as financial market  efficiency grows,
informational advantages by individual agents are competed away  and no  longer assure
them permanent extra-rents.  Competition between  banks  and nonbanks  increases. Also,
synergies  from  joining  banking  and  nonbanking  financial  intermediation  functions
increasingly lead to conglomeration or mergers of banks and nonbanks.
In a decentralized financial environment, funds can be more easily withdrawn from
fund-users that are perceived to be riskier, bringing them under stronger market discipline.
On the other hand, markets become subject to large price  and funding  volatility due to
higher sensitivity of financing decisions to shifts in risk perceptions, new information, and
changes in market opinion and sentiment. Thus, while financial resource allocation under
".small  investor" finance is more efficient than in alternative regimes, the circuit process is
more vulnerable  to  a  less  stable  supply of  funds that  may  hinder  its  normal  closure.
Moreover, although the quality of both capital and output is higher, real investments may
turn out to be more volatile and the spread of disturbances across sequential circuit rounds
more likely to occur. Greater uncertainty may tighten credit to production and reduce bank
flexibility in assisting illiquid firms at circuit-end.
Finally, in a "small investor"  financial system, liberalized banking  markets allow
banks (especially large clearing banks) to regain greater seigniorage power than under state
finance, although competition among banks and between banks and nonbanks in traditional
banking activities may limit the seigniorage power of individual banks. On the other hand,
49with developed capital markets, corporate ownership and control tend to shift to the wider
public.
Banks, finance, and economic development: what's next?
The "age of the small investor" is already a reality in the most advanced economies.
It will be more and more pervasive as progress in knowledge, technology,  and financial
infrastructure enables larger masses of individual agents to take position  in the financial
markets. Of course, the age of the small investor lies still far ahead in the future of many
developing countries that today lag much behind the post-industrial world. Yet late comers
usually jump  to  their  future much more rapidly  than it took  for  the  early pioneers to
discover  theirs.  Also,  late  comers  often  skip  intermediate  stages,  benefiting  from  the
experience of their forerunners and cutting many corners.
Thus, trying to see how banking and financial intermediation might tend to evolve
in the age of the small investor may well be in the spirit of searching for guidance to the
future of many. With no pretence of articulating future comprehensive scenarios, one might
anticipate one or two interesting developments just by looking at how finance will need to
cope with the issue of trust in the new age.
The age of the small investor is the age of rapid progress in communications and
information technologies. Indeed, small investors would not be relevant at all if it were not
for the irresistible power that technology grants them at an increase pace. As technological
development proceeds, thus, the options and opportunities available to investors continue to
grow while transaction costs decline further.
What is the prospective role of banks and intermediaries in all this? Will they lose
ground to direct finance, as savers and fund users are less and less inhibited by time, space,
and information constraints to meet one another directly in the e-market arena?
A few observations. First, the openness and speed that the e-age allows individuals
to enjoy in managing their choices generate larger networks where possible  contacts  and
feasible options become countless. This is what creates opportunities; however, it is also
where the impossibility for each network node to know the others  comes into play as a
critical limitation of direct transactions. Big numbers run counter the individuals'  need to
overcome  the natural  mutual  distrust  that  derives  from  not  knowing  each  other  well,
50especially  in  the  face  of  complex  transactions  and  risks.  And  no  matter  how  much
information  is  available  to  establish  the  trustworthiness  of  potential  counterparties  to
transactions and to assess risks, this information is hard to collect, assemble, and process; it
requires time,  resources,  and  skills.  And,  by  the way:  how  can  one  be  sure that  the
information available is reliable and its source trustworthy, to start with?
Second, transactions in the network require that the agents trust the network, that is,
its infrastructure. The more immaterial the mode of exchange, the greater the agents' need
to make sure that immaterial transactions do not "dematerialize" their value for good!
Who's  going  to  bridge  across  these  legitimate  trust  gaps?  How  can  societies
(especially in developing countries) benefit from the new technologies in the presence of
large trust gaps?
There  are basically two categories of institutions  that will play  a crucial role in
making networks grow and become consolidated realities. They are, again, the banks and
the financial intermediaries, with very important and specialized tasks to perform each.
Banks
In a world where trust matters more than ever, even less than in the conventional
world can money creation be left to anybody to perform, although it was earlier argued that
the incentive to enter this business will be stronger than under conventional banking. Also,
contrary to the current trend toward domestic gross settlement payment systems around the
globe, the high cost of such systems might push back the reintroduction  of correspondent
banking and netting arrangements (though strengthened as necessary to deal with systemic
risks) or it might lead to the introduction of hybrid arrangements (see section 4 and also
McAndrews, 1997).
Size will matter even more to banks. First, a large deposit base will be necessary for
them to  extract greater  seigniorage in  an environment where  the increasing  velocity of
deposits  and  the  larger  circulation  of  quasi-monies  make  core  deposits  less  relevant.
Second, only large and highly visible banks with strong reputational capital will be able to
attract depositors' trust: the more money will be immaterial, the more people will want to
know who produces it. Large size and large capital base will be crucial in both respects.
Crucial will also be the visibility that banks will be able to  earn in the market as
trustworthy institutions.  Since the use of bank capital as a reputational  signaling device
51involves significant economies of scale (Hughes and Mester,  1998), banks will have one
more incentive to reach for larger sizes in a world where reputation matters more.
Financial intermediaries
In  a network-based  world, where trust  gaps may be  formidable for the  reasons
discussed above, nonbank intermediaries play an essential role. They will be integral to the
infrastructure serving  individual agents and will provide  the seal  of  trust necessary for
individuals to use the networks. Their trust provision will be enhanced by the competition
or contestability of the markets where they operate. More and more financial intermediaries
will combine communications, information, and financial knowledge to supply agents with
secure exchange mechanisms and reliable, high-quality information. They will produce and
process the information needed to enable millions of anonymous individuals to interact and
trade in the web, while their reputational capital and expertise will be necessary to validate
the quality of the information exchanged. Nonbank intermediaries will be in a middleman
position to bridge knowledge between savers and fund users and to best direct customers in
counterparty selection and deal makings.
As networks bring in more participants and business opportunities, such knowledge
will  be  useful  for  the  intermediaries  themselves  to  provide  risk  aggregation  and
diversification services that cannot be performed by individual agents, or that may be too
costly for individuals to perform. It will also allow intermediaries to benefit simultaneously
from the externalities associated with large numbers of customers and from the opportunity
to  package  specialized  and customized services based  on the knowledge  of  customers'
individual preferences and needs.
In  short,  although  in  the  future  the  circuit  process  will  look  increasingly
sophisticated,  its  basic  banking  and  financial  functions  will  remain  fundamental  and
fundamentally the same. Banks and nonbanks will become even more crucial as individuals
take a more active interest in saving and investing.
52Less  banking,  more intermediation
Far from making banking redundant, technological progress will nonetheless further
the consolidation process of banks with nonbanks due to the impact of  information on the
financial sector structure.
In the early developmental stages, countries are characterized, inter alia, by poor
financial infrastructure, including weak contract enforcement and deficient legal rules and
systems, inadequate accounting/auditing practices and professions, non existent investor
protection  guarantees,  lacking  mechanisms  for  asset resolution,  costly  information on
business counterparties  and  trade  opportunities, and  backward  telecommunication  and
information technologies.
Under these circumstances, transaction costs are prohibitive  for individuals and
nonbank institutions to engage in investment finance and to manage diversified financial
portfolios. In such a context, banks can fill the gap between savers and capital users more
efficiently than any other intermediary types, owing to  their peculiar relationships with
borrowers.  Through  such  relationships,  banks  can  supplement  the  lack  of  financial
infrastructural services by  accessing the information directly  from the borrowers.  This
grants them with sufficient rent-extraction power which they use to access liquidity from
depositors in exchange for a credible promise to transfer back to them a share of the rents
extracted (see once more Diamond and Rajan 1999, 199b).
As financial infrastructure develops, the banks'  quasi-monopoly of information is
broken  and  information  is  no  longer  concentrated  within  exclusive  bank-borrower
relationships. As a result, the value of the firms become known to the market and the banks
lose their comparative advantage on extracting rents from capital users: banks lose markets
to nonbanks and seek to recover such losses by entering the nonbanking business. Indeed,
this seems to be actually taking place in the industrial world (Allen and Santomero, 1999).
At the same time, as competition in the nonbanking sector reduces net margins,
nonbanks may have more than an incentive to merge and conglomerate their activities with
banks in an attempt to gain some shares of their seigniorage from e-money creation.
538. Conclusions
This long journey through the theory of banking and finance has sought to show
that banks are - and remain - special institutions with a fundamental role to play in  market
economies.
Over the last two decades, the mainstream literature on the theory of finance has
offered significant contributions to the understanding of banks, identifying specific aspects
that qualify  them  as special  intermediaries. Contributions  have differently  focused  on
functions such as liquidity and payment services, credit supply, and information provision -
all areas where banks have historically developed a comparative advantage vis-a-vis other
types of intermediaries.
But  the evolution  of  finance - through  greater market  competition, progress  in
technology,  and  institutional  development  - has  increasingly  eroded  this  comparative
advantage. Not to mention that - as many foresee - the future success of electronic monies
might deal a fatal blow to conventional banking, generating entirely new ways of doing
finance.
This study has shown that, once money, production, and investment are looked at in
an integrated way, banks and nonbank financial intermediaries can be seen as performing
complementary functions essential to the economy.
The study has also shown that not recognizing the specialness of banks  may lead to
policies that place heavy - and perhaps unnecessary - burdens on real economic activity and
diminish the market's capacity to conjugate efficiency and risk optimally.
The study argues that banks remain central to the economy, irrespective of whether
production financing loses ground as a source of core banking business.
The study has looked at the way in which banking and finance interrelate differently
in  the  course  of  economic  development,  leading  to  different  efficiency/stability
configurations.  Finally,  noting  that  the  expansion of  communication  possibilities  will
increasingly require  societies to  deal with  the  problem  of  overcoming  mutual  distrust
among anonymous individuals, the study has argued that banks and financial intermediaries
are  uniquely  placed  to  bridge  trust  gaps  in  the  areas  of  money  creation  and  fund
intermediation.
54The study finally predicts that banking will not only survive the advent of the e-
money, but that it will play a main-actor role in producing it. It suggests that, as one
recognizes  the formidable  incentive  implicit  in issuing  money via lending, banking  appears
bound to remain an important  reality,  notwithstanding  the technological  transformation  that
money  may undergo  over time as a vehicle  of purchasing  power. In so far as technological
progress speeds up the velocity at which virtual money circulates, the incentive to issue
money through lendifg may increase manifold, carrying with it problems of poor credit
quality and money  overissue  and,  most of all, raising  the prospect that any nonbank  entities
may  want to act like  banks and reap  rents from seigniorage.
The study leads to conclude that, after all, the e-money will not change what is
special about  banks. Irrespective  of its technological  and material nature, bank money  has
always been "virtual" since it has  always consisted of  promises issued by  entities
specialized  in attracting  public trust. Any steps further into the era of e-finance  will only
reaffirm  the inherent and attractive  virtuality of money, and will always call on banks to
give  money  a real content and  to preserve  it.
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